1. 如何判定一個人,在經歷一段時間後,仍是同一個人?在 personal identity 的討論中,有人主張以身體或大腦的是否同一來判定,有人則以記憶、經驗、或心理的連續性來作為標準。針對「心理連續性的標準」(the psychological continuity criterion),有一個重要的反對論證:"reduplication argument",來自 Bernard Williams' "personal identity and individuation"。論證如下:

A man called Charles turns up in the twentieth century claiming to be Guy Fawks. "All the events he claims to have witnessed and all the actions he claims to have done point unanimously to the life of some one person in the past...Guy Fawkes. Not only do all Charles' memory-claims that can be checked fit the pattern of Fawkes' life as known by historians, but others that can not be checked are plausible, provide explanations of unknown facts and so on. Are we to say that Charles is now Guy Fawkes, that Guy Fawkes has come to life again in Charles' body, or some other thing?"

We have reason not to accept the description of Charles' condition as his being identical with Guy Fawkes. "If it is logically possible that Charles should undergo the changes described, then it is logically possible that some other man should simultaneously undergo the same changes; e.g. that both Charles and his brother Robert should be found in this condition. What should we say in that case? They cannot both be Guy Fawkes; if they were, Guy Fawkes would be in two places at once, which is absurd. Moreover, if they were both identical with Guy Fawkes, they would be identical with each other, which is also absurd. Hence we could not say that there were both identical with Guy Fawkes. We might instead say that one of them was identical with Guy Fawkes, and that the other was just like him; but this would be an utterly vacuous manoeuvre, since there would be ex hypothesi no principle determining which description was to apply to which. So it would be best, if anything, to say that both had mysteriously become like Guy Fawkes, clairvoyantly knew about him, or something like this. If this would be the best description of each of the two, why would it not be the best description of Charles if Charles alone were changed?"

(1) 請分析誼個論證, 說明這個論證如何挑戰「心理連續性的標準」, (2) 並討論持「心理連續性的標準」的人會如何答辯。然後, (3) 說明你自己對這個辯論的看法。

八十四學年度 <u>花 学</u> 所 <u>組碩士班研究生入學者試</u> 科目 <u>オ と 学 科號 43 04 共 2 頁第 2 頁 *請在試巻【答案巻】內作答</u>

2.何謂「價值」(yalue)?試分析下面這對羧語中以「重要」(miportance) 概念為核心所展開的關於「價值的客觀性」的論證,並提出你自己對於「何謂價值,這個問題的觀點。

"Once we grasp the meaning of importance we become aware that this ultimate question exists independently of our motivation. In approaching a being the question of its importance presents itself not merely from the point of view of any possible motivation. The question of importance has as much an original and objective meaning as the question of truth and existence. It is clearly absurd to suppose that the question of being and existence presents itself only for our knowledge and from the point of view of satisfying our knowledge. The same applies to the question of importance. The contrast between the gray, insipid emptiness of the indifferient and the colorful, meaningful plentitude of the important discloses to us the ultimate import of this question. We could not sustain for one moment the fiction of an absolutely neutral and indifferent world. importance is as fundamental as being. The supposition that there exists no importance, that everything is in reality neutral, that all importance is a mere relational aspect, would mean a complete collapse of the universe. We realize the fundamental - I would even say, inevitable - significance of the question: What is the meaning, the importance, of a being "

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