國立清華大學 106 學年度碩士班考試入學試題

系所班組別:哲學研究所碩士班

考試科目 (代碼): 英文 (3701)

共 2 頁,第 1 頁 *請在【答案卷、卡】作答

請將下面的英文段落翻譯成中文(共三題,總分100分)。

- 1. "That this assumption was at the heart of the doctrine is shown by the fact that there was from the beginning felt to be a major theoretical difficulty in explaining how minds can influence and be influenced by bodies. How can a mental process, such as willing, cause spatial movements like the movements of the tongue? How can a physical change in the optic nerve have among its effects a mind's perception of a flash of light? This notorious crux by itself shows the logical mould into which Descartes pressed his theory of the mind. It was the same mould into which he and Galileo set their mechanics. Still unwittingly adhering to the grammar of mechanics, he tried to avert disaster by describing minds in what was merely an obverse vocabulary. The workings of minds had to be described by the mere negatives of the specific descriptions given to the bodies; they are not in space, they are not motions, they are not modifications of matter, they are not accessible to public observation. Minds are not bits of clockwork, they are just bits of not-clockwork." (from Gilbert Ryle's "Descartes' Myth") (30%)
- 2. "Morality is a distinct, independent dimension of our experience, and it exercises its own sovereignty. We cannot argue ourselves free of it except by its own leave, except, as it were, by making our peace with it. We may well discover that what we now think about virtue or vice or duty or right is inconsistent with other things we also think, about cosmology or psychology or history. If so, we must try to reestablish harmony, but that is a process whose results must make moral sense as well as every other kind of sense. Even in the most extreme case, when we are offered grounds for scorching doubt, we still need moral judgment at some deep level to decide whether that doubt is justified and what its consequences for virtue and vice, duty and right, really are. No matter what we learn about the physical or mental world, including ourselves, it must remain an open question, and one that calls for a moral rather than any other kind of judgment, how we ought to respond. If morality is to be destroyed, it must preside over its own destruction." (from Ronald Dworkin, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It") (30%)

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3. "How is it that we can be moved by what we know does not exist, namely the situations of people in fictional stories? The so-called "paradox of emotional response to fiction" is an argument for the conclusion that our emotional response to fiction is irrational. The argument contains an inconsistent triad of premises, all of which seem initially plausible. These premises are (1) that in order for us to be moved (to tears, to anger, to horror) by what we come to learn about various people and situations, we must believe that the people and situations in question really exist or existed; (2) that such "existence beliefs" are lacking when we knowingly engage with fictional texts; and (3) that fictional characters and situations do in fact seem capable of moving us at times.

A number of conflicting solutions to this paradox have been proposed by philosophers of art. While some argue that our apparent emotional responses to fiction are only "make-believe" or pretend, others claim that existence beliefs aren't necessary for having emotional responses (at least to fiction) in the first place. And still others hold that there is nothing especially problematic about our emotional responses to works of fiction, since what these works manage to do (when successful) is create in us the "illusion" that the characters and situations depicted therein actually exist." (from "the Paradox of Fiction", *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*) (40%)